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On the Emptiness of an Encounter: Althusser’s Reading of 
Machiavelli
By Filippo Del Lucchese
Translation by Warren Montag
An “encounter”—a word repeated “without end” by Marx—impelled 
Althusser to take up Machiavelli. A very “Italian” encounter, thanks to a 
stunning Sicilian beauty, and a visit to Cesare Borgia’s Romagna:1   first 
Gramsci, and immediately after him, Machiavelli.2  An aleatory and 
contingent, but nevertheless necessary, encounter. Above all, a very strange 
encounter. Strange not so much that it took place, but how it took place, the 
way in which Althusser decided to “embrace” Machiavelli’s thought. After 
all, Althusser was a philosopher who distanced himself from philosophy:
“e further I go, the more I am convinced, to my great regret, that I am not 
a philosopher. And yet I must be, because from this point on it is possible 
and necessary to be one. But it is not for me. I know little and have no more 
time to learn anything. I am a political agitator in philosophy. ere must be 
such types to open new paths. Others, younger, better equipped with all 
kinds of knowledge will be the philosopher that I cannot be.”3
And so it was that “this” Althusser sought to make Machiavelli, that is, 
someone who clearly isn’t a philosopher in the traditional sense, precisely a 
philosopher, or at least a theoretician. Machiavelli is foreign to the world of 
the “classical” concepts of philosophers: it was in this way that Althusser 
began the notes to his 1962 course, the first written text he devoted to 
Machiavelli.4  To his thought—and here is the paradox—which exudes 
theoretical significance, the philosophers denied any theoretical significance. 
It is here that the challenge begins. It requires—argues Althusser—nothing 
less than a redefinition of “the very nature” of the theoretical object as 
understood in the classics:
“What I want to suggest is that the contradiction of the practical or latent 
recognition of the theoretical meaning of Machiavelli’s thought on the one 
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hand and the denial of any theoretical significance to this very thought by 
the same theoreticians themselves, on the other,  is perhaps the occasion and 
the means of posing the problem of the very nature of the theoretical object 
in the classics. If Machiavelli has a theoretical value, it is the theoretical value 
of the object of political theory that finds itself concerned, its pretentions 
contested and in a sense judged by this preliminary calling into question that 
is Machiavelli’s unrecognized theory.”5
       It is thus a question of a paradoxical encounter that from the outset 
gives rise to a solemn vow: nothing less than a redefinition of “the theoretical 
object.” 
 is important and solemn vow will be kept. Machiavelli will become 
a vertebra in the spinal column of the proper redefinition of theory and of 
philosophy that will [become] aleatory materialism. But in an apparently 
paradoxical way, what emerges is rather the “emptiness” (il vuoto) of an 
encounter. It is a matter of an often ambivalent or fragmentary and, in many 
cases, not very original reading. Neither as original nor as powerful as 
Machiavelli’s theoretical presence in the dispositive of aleatory materialism.
Powerless solitude
One of the themes that most interested Althusser in the 1962 course was the 
relation between anthropology and politics in Machiavelli within the broader 
context of modern political philosophy. On the one hand, speaking neither of 
man nor of human nature but of “men” in the plural, Machiavelli—such is 
Althusser’s not particularly penetrating conclusion—was not interested in 
nor did he construct a political anthropology, as would for example Hobbes 
or Spinoza. On the other hand, if some form of anthropology can be found 
in Machiavelli, it has no explicit or direct connection to politics. e minimal 
use that Machiavelli makes of anthropology corresponds to a rejection of any 
ethical or religious foundation for social behavior. But this anthropology 
remains “negative and critical,” and is never positive, that is, there exists no 
“genetic deduction of social and political forms on the basis of a theory of 
human nature.”6  is is “Machiavelli’s solitude,” the fortuitous expression 
that Althusser continued to use and which appeared early on.7  is is not, 
however, the solitude of an original critique, but rather the solitude of 
“failure,” of impotence and powerlessness:
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“It cannot be said however that this solitude of  Machiavelli’s  is the solitude 
of a critique. Machiavelli is not beyond the classical theoretical operation; he 
is inside it. We might even say that the failure of his anthropological and 
historico-philosophical endeavors (tentatives) testified more to an impotence 
of fact, an incapacity to express what he had to say in the sanctioned 
philosophical concepts, than to a genuine critical consciousness”8 (244).
It would be possible to dispute this conclusion, in large measure on the basis 
of Machiavellian texts, as well as his relation to the Moderns, even while 
acknowledging the obvious diﬀerences in chronological perspective. 
Moreover, it would be possible to demonstrate that Machiavelli develops  a 
political anthropology with which Modernity felt a profound need to carry 
on a dialogue.9
 Nevertheless, rather than contrast Machiavelli’s texts to Althusser’s 
reading, it seems more useful to test the latter’s conclusions against the much 
larger consideration of Machiavelli’s position in the history of philosophy. 
e theses concerning Machiavelli’s  “failure” and his “incapacity” are quite 
diﬀerent from the references to Machiavelli in some of Althusser’s later 
texts. Let us take as an example the famous and striking parallel between 
Marx’s Capital and Machiavelli’s Prince that Althusser proposes in 
“Machiavelli’s Solitude.” By describing primitive accumulation, Marx 
destroyed the illusion of an edifying history of the origin of, and encounter 
between, capital and labor. In the same way, Machiavelli described “primitive 
political accumulation” in response (in the  theoretical rather than 
chronological sense) to theories of natural right and of the modern State:
“I would say that, all things being equal,  Machiavelli responds in somewhat 
the same way to the natural right philosophers’ edifying discourse on the 
history of the state. I would even go so far as to suggest that Machiavelli is 
one of the rare witnesses to what I call “primitive political accumulation,” one 
of the rare theoreticians of the beginnings of the national state. Instead of 
telling us that the state is born from law (droit) and nature, he tells us how a 
state that seeks to endure and to be strong enough to be the state of a nation 
must be born.”10
Althusser—from within this powerful comparison-- seems not to notice that 
Marx’s demystification and refutation of the bourgeois individual, of the 
independent worker and his economic spirit, corresponds to a great extent to 
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the demystification and refutation that Machiavelli carried out through an 
“anthropology” in the classical sense of the term. When Althusser speaks in 
1962 of Machiavelli’s “failure”, he seems not to see that the foundations of 
this “failure” are precisely the foundations that make possible, from a 
theoretical point of view, the rapprochement between Machiavelli’s realism 
and that of Marx, which is in fact proclaimed in “Machiavelli’s Solitude. ” 
Even more curious is the fact that the most powerful challenge to the notion 
of the abstract individual in modernity was that posed by Spinoza, a 
challenge based explicitly on Machiavelli’s anthropological realism.11
Let us take another example. Althusser focuses on Machiavelli’s use of 
Polybius to break free from a linear and cyclical conception of history 
according to which the destiny of states would be inscribed in their origins, a 
theme, of course, of capital importance to any Marxist. Althusser correctly 
stresses the way in which Machiavelli distances himself from Polybius: states 
do not follow the trajectory of the generation and corruption of the diﬀerent 
forms of government in a linear manner because they encounter along the 
way other stronger and more powerful states—and therefore, war—that 
interrupt and oppose this cycle, which would otherwise continue infinitely.12
e most powerfully original element in the heterodox use to which 
Machiavelli puts Polybius is the connection between war and “class struggle.” 
e diﬀerence in power between states in conflict depends directly on the 
conflict between the people and the great internal to each state13. What is 
truly new in Machiavelli’s analysis is his linking indissolubly (or perhaps his 
unmasking of the ideologies that separate) external war and internal class 
conflict.14
us not only does Althusser not capture the originality of this argument, 
but he goes on to aﬃrm that Machiavelli’s force lies in his valorization of 
“mixed government.” e union of the three forms of good government—
neutralized as singular forms—permits a way out of Polybius’s circle and of 
his philosophy of history:
e theory of cycles is called into question by the constitution of this mixed 
government that unites the advantages of the three good governments: the 
prince+the great+people. How can we interpret this synthesis if not as a 
synthesis that allows the hope of escaping the law of infinity itself in the 
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constitution of a government that combines (by mutually neutralizing) the 
specific and beneficial principles of the three fundamental governments? I 
would therefore say: the infinity of the cycle of history is abstract. e 
concrete is the struggle between the states that interrupts the infinity of the 
cycle at the point at which it arrives at that mixed state, so well ordered that 
it is itself a challenge to the infinity of the cycle15.
On the theoretical plane, as I have noted, this is Polybius’s reading and 
before him, Aristotle’s.16  Althusser’s reading thus lacks any reference to 
Machiavelli’s originality in relation to his classical sources that, nevertheless, 
plays a powerful role in his theory of conflict.
In contrast to what Althusser says concerning the theme of anthropology, 
the reading of this particular element in Machiavelli does not appear to 
change in any significant way even in the later writings. Once again the 
solution is a “synthesis” of the three forms Machiavelli supposedly extracted 
from Polybius:
“Such, in its simplicity, is the cyclical theory of history, the typology of 
governments, as partially borrowed by Machiavelli from Polybius. By means 
of the third thesis on the cyclical character of history, Machiavelli seems to 
have achieved, brought oﬀ, a “synthesis,’ in the vulgar-Hegelian sense, 
between the first thesis (immutable order) and the second (universal 
mobility). What is the historical cycle if not the immobile motion, the 
immutable movement, of the recurrence of the same changes (37-38)?”17
We cannot fail to see the allusion—all the more enigmatic when we grant 
the terms used by Althusser their proper weight—to a language that recalls 
Aristotle’s concepts.
What Althusser reproaches Machiavelli for—his not entirely knowing how 
or being capable of expressing his revolutionary thought—seems to be 
reflected in his own analysis: Althusser intuits the originality of Machiavelli
—and here begins his “intimate” relation, which will lead to an 
“identification”—which paradoxically is not to be found in his texts where 
there is nothing absolutely original. 
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e discussion in Althusser’s later writings reworked up until 1986, collected 
in the second volume of the Écrits philosophiques et politiques might appear 
diﬀerent. It diﬀers, however, only in appearance insofar as this Machiavelli is 
much more mature and powerful when read from the perspective of the late 
Althusser and of aleatory materialism. Further, this projection onto aleatory 
materialism is more often than not merely apparent and is carried out on a 
purely linguistic level. 
Althusser speaks of Machiavelli’s thought as the thought of “the singular 
conjuncture,” of “the singular aleatory case,” of “aleatory dialectical 
determination.” But François Matheron’s editorial notes opportunely remind 
us that these are all—with unvarying regularity—“late handwritten 
addenda.” It is as if Althusser, as seen through these additional notes, had, 
over the years,  read through diﬀerent lenses what he had earlier 
done and simply “stuck ” the language and categories of aleatory materialism 
on to his earlier reading of Machiavelli. is is interesting because in reality 
what Althusser describes in these texts diﬀers significantly from and 
coincides only superficially with that authentic theoretical “arsenal” that goes 
by the name “Machiavelli,” with the status it conferred and the role it played 
in the establishment of the materialism of the encounter. 
He attempts to describe through the potent and evocative language of 
aleatory materialism a “distant” theoretical object, as for example in the 
following quasi-definition Althusser oﬀers of “thinking in the conjuncture.” 
It concerns what it means for Machiavelli to think the problem of the unity 
of the Italian national state in the conjuncture:
“what does it mean to think in the conjuncture? To think about a political 
problem under the category of the conjuncture? It means, first of all, taking 
into account all the determinations, all the existing concrete circumstances, 
making an inventory, a detailed breakdown and comparison of them. . . . is 
inventory of elements and circumstances, however, is insuﬃcient. To think in 
terms of the category of conjuncture is not to think on the conjuncture as 
one would reflect on a set of concrete data. To think under the conjuncture is 
quite literally to submit to the problem induced and imposed by its case [a 
late handwritten addendum]: the political problem of national unity and the 
constitution of Italy into a national state. . . Machiavelli merely registers in 
his theoretical position a problem that is objectively posed by the case of [a 
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late handwritten addendum] the conjuncture: not by simple intellectual 
comparisons, but by the confrontation of existing class forces and their 
relationship of uneven development—in fact by their aleatory future [late 
handwritten addendum].”18
Other examples, relative to Machiavelli and Us, merit our attention. e first 
that particularly demands our scrutiny is the distinct way Althusser speaks of 
Machiavelli using the Aristotelian categories of “matter” and “form.” 
Machiavelli, it is true, uses this language but once again employs only the 
words and not the concepts, which he transforms, using a rhetorical strategy 
dear to Spinoza, by reversing them. For Machiavelli (in this case an authentic 
“son of the earth” against the “friends of the forms”) seems to grant clear 
priority to matter over form. Matter that is intact or matter that is corrupt 
oﬀers political actors the “occasion” to demonstrate their virtù.19 It is thus the 
opposite of the passive element conceived by Aristotle: Florence is matter 
that is apt to be ordered as a republic and whoever seeks to bring about the 
contrary will necessarily fail. It is not by chance that the couplet matter/form 
was usually employed with that of fortune/occasion.20
Althusser explained this with greater clarity in the 1962 course, clearly 
separating Machiavelli from Aristotelian categories and concepts:
“e political “matter” of which Machiavelli speaks when he has the Italian 
situation in view is not even comparable to Aristotelian energeia (puissance) 
that at the same time lacks , but aspires to, its form and contains (like a block 
of marble in which certain veins suggest the form that the sculptor will give 
it) its future design. It is still less comparable to the interior form contained 
by the Hegelian moment of history (that prepares within it, without 
knowing it , the implicit form that, once rejected by the previous form, 
appears in the advent of the new epoch). No: matter is the pure void (vide) of 
form, the purely unformed attempt at form. e Italian matter is an empty 
(vide) puissance that awaits a form that will be brought to and imposed upon 
it from the outside21 . 
Here it is a question, adds Althusser, of the recognition of the “radical 
contingency” by which the new form comes to be “applied” to the existing 
matter. e necessity of a new form has as its condition the radical 
contingency of a new beginning.22
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Now, from this conclusion, so clearly argued in 1962, there follows in the 
later writings a more ambivalent and obscure position. What is the form—
asks Althusser—under which all the positive forces available to realize the 
political objective of national unity can be united? is form is the Prince, an 
exceptional individual endowed with exceptional virtue that, in exceptional 
circumstances, would be capable of mobilizing the necessary forces.23  What 
emerges from this Machiavellian principle is almost a philosophy of history:
Machiavelli’s prince is an absolute sovereign to whom history assigns a 
decisive ‘task:’ “giving form” to an existing matter, a matter aspiring to its 
form--the nation. Machiavelli’s New Prince is thus a specific political form 
charged with executing the historical demands ‘on the agenda:’ the 
constitution of a nation.24
Naturally, behind these considerations is Gramsci’s reading and the new 
prince. Even as he advocates a critical assessment of Gramsci’s words, 
Althusser shares and values his political and cultural project: “this is how, in 
the dark night of fascism, Machiavelli ‘speaks” to Gramsci: in the future 
tense. And the Modern prince then casts its light on the New Prince: 
Gramsci calmly writes that the e Prince is a ‘manifesto’ and a 
‘revolutionary utopia.’ For the sake of brevity, let us say ‘a revolutionary 
utopian manifesto.’
On the one had, the philosophical charge of this language could not have 
escaped Althusser, although, on the other, he seems in contrast to tend to 
force Machiavelli into conformity with Gramsci’s reading. If Althusser 
distances himself in many ways from Gramsci, as, for example, on the 
question of the interpenetration of force and consent, 25 
  here, in contrast, he seems fully to adhere to him, going so far as to say that
“If the novel relations to theory and antiquity are original and positively 
fertile , it remains the case that they are not devoid of a certain illusion: the 
utopian illusion. If it is true that every utopia scans the past for the guarantee 
and shape of the future, Machiavelli, who seeks the future solution to Italy’s 
political problem in Rome, does not escape the illusion of utopia.”26
A utopian Machiavelli and thus a prisoner of an illusion and of the limits of 
his own analysis. It would be possible to bring to light other examples to 
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show the ambivalence and weakness of the Althusserian reading of 
Machiavelli. But I believe it is more interesting at this point to pose a 
diﬀerent problem in relation to these texts, to cease our reading for a 
moment to concentrate on the theoretical problem that emerges from the 
encounter between Althusser and Machiavelli. “It is necessary to consider—
writes Althusser—not the formal letter of Machiavelli’s texts, but their 
functioning”27   In the same way, it might be useful to set aside the “formal 
letter” of  Althusser’s texts in order to examine  their theoretical functioning. 
e best way to do so is precisely through Gramsci., in part to show the 
limits of his reading without, as so often happens, forgetting its potential, but 
also because this same potential has an historical as well as theoretical 
importance. And from this “mix” of  Machiavelli—Gramsci—Althusser 
theoretical elements of extraordinary importance are born. 
Commentators often insist on the linearity of the Gramscian reading and 
the diﬃculties that result from the “translation” or from the political use of 
Machiavelli’s Prince from the perspective of a political party. A typical 
example of the problematic nature of such a translation would be the 
connection Gramsci established between the Jacobins and the context of 
Physiocracy, asking if Machiavelli in some way had “anticipated those times” 
and had anticipated in some way a demand (esigenza) that later found 
expression in the Physiocrats.28  
Nevertheless, taking into account here again the stratified and complex 
character of these texts, the excessive linearity that emerges from Gramsci’s 
Machiavelli and that without a doubt attracted the attention of Althusser, is 
not as banal or naïve as might appear at first glance. It suﬃces to see that if 
Althusser’s intention is to make Machiavelli a philosopher, it is precisely 
because it is on this point that the Gramscian critique of Croce’s position of 
the re-evaluation of the “political-practical” of both Machiavelli and, at the 
same time, of Marx is based.29
From the point of view, then, of a conception of history, of its openness and 
of the possibility of intervening in it—a theme as dear to Machiavelli as, for 
diﬀerent reasons, to Althusser—there is nothing naïve about the Gramscian 
reading of virtu as the principle of intervention in the “conjuncture.” 
Concerning military organization, Gramsci writes:
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“e decisive element in every situation is the permanently organized and 
long prepared force which can be put in the field when it is judged that a 
situation is favorable (and it can be favorable only insofar as such a force 
exists and is full of fighting spirit). erefore the essential task is that of 
systematically and patiently ensuring that this force is formed, developed and 
rendered ever more homogeneous, compact and self-aware. is is clear from 
military history, and from the care with which in every period armies have 
been prepared in advance to be able to make war at any moment. e great 
Powers have become great precisely because they were at all times prepared 
to intervene eﬀectively in favorable international conjunctures—which were 
precisely favorable because there was the concrete possibility of eﬀectively 
intervening in it.”30
It would be diﬃcult to imagine a description closer to the Machiavellian idea 
of the intervention of virtù in the conjuncture. e entire of Machiavelli’s 
reflection on the interweaving of politics and war, in particular in the Art of 
War, is designed to develop the idea of preparing the best conditions for 
intervening in the conjuncture (never the perfect conditions, only the best).31
And it is even more significant that Gramsci speaks of this conception 
through a reference to Albert Mathiez who, in his interpretation of the 
French revolution, precisely denounced the naiveté of a linear conception of 
the relation between crisis and ruptures in history.32
We are thus very far from an attempt to use Machiavelli “as a mere 
instrument with which to establish a linear process and to sketch out a 
vulgar philosophy of history.33  I wonder if, when Althusser speaks of 
conjuncture in his texts on Machiavelli—something again quite distinct 
from the “conjuncture” that appears in his writings on aleatory materialism—
he isn’t very close to and does not express something very similar to what 
Gramsci says here. us, through these texts it is possible to see, on the one 
hand, a Gramsci less adapted to a vulgar and linear conception of the 
philosophy of history, and, on the other, an Althusser who is still working to 
forge the valuable theoretical instrument that will be the Machiavelli of 
aleatory materialism.
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But still more interesting is the relative ambivalence toward the conception 
of the Prince and the knot of problems that derives from it. Here, with the 
conception of the party as modern prince, we are no longer following 
Machiavelli’s interpretation, but rather a notion of an “instrumental” use that 
seems totally adapted to the politics of Gramsci’s time. Nevertheless, this 
usage, so modernized and appropriated for political purposes, seems 
paradoxically to produce interesting theoretical eﬀects. Eﬀects that emerge as 
much from Althusser’s reading as from the role that Althusser has played or 
could play in contemporary philosophico-political debates.
II. e Prince, Partial Principle.
e “Notes on Machiavelli” open with a portrait of the leader who represents 
in “plastic” and “anthropomorphic form,” the symbol of the “collective will:”
“e modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete 
individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which 
a collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent 
asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already 
provided this organism, and it is the political party—the first cell in which 
there come together germs of a collective will tending to become universal 
and total.”34
e Jacobins (this was the parallel traced by Gramsci) were the “categorical 
incarnation” of Machiavelli’s Prince and the “theory” of the new Prince 
should include  a component  devoted precisely to the political and collective 
will and to its historical, but partial, aﬃrmation. Here Gramsci takes aim at 
Sorel and a certain conception of revolutionary spontaneity that is doomed 
to defeat and disintegration.
Beyond the obvious anti-Sorelian aspect (and Gramsci’s avoidance of the 
Rousseauian expression “general will” in favor of “collective will” is 
significant), this interpretation has an obvious and profound theoretical 
interest beyond its historiographical accuracy, that has nothing to do with, 
and in fact goes far beyond, the political problem of organization and the 
party. Its interest consists in showing how the Prince, for Machiavelli, is an 
element of the part, a partial element, an actor in the struggle. His virtù  is 
Filippo Del Lucchese
11
Del Lucchese tr. Warren Montag: On the Emptiness of an Encounter: Althusser’s Reading of Machiave
Published by OxyScholar, 2014
not displayed in the organization of a superior principle that governs from 
above and organizes the conflict from a transcendental position, but only 
works within and through the conflict in a radically immanent way.35 
e importance of this conception goes far beyond an interpretation of 
Machiavelli. In fact, in recent philosophical-political debates, a discussion 
has developed around Althusser’s reading of Machiavelli and in particular 
around the conception and role of the Prince. Here again Althusser’s reading 
seems particularly ambivalent. e Prince as political manifesto, the 
importance of the “disequilibrium” discussed in the Proem; the distance that 
that Machiavelli, the writer who became part of the people to speak of the 
prince, violently stresses: the theoretical agreement between e Prince and 
e Discourses;  all these themes show how Althusser, like Gramsci, 
understood the relevance and the value, both philosophical and political, of 
Machiavelli. e Prince is irreducibly a partial principle, which is also plural, 
multiple, collective and conflictual. Because it does not represent the people 
(reduced to unity as in Hobbes’s model of sovereignty): the Prince is the 
people against the great.36 
At the same time, however, Althusser seems sometimes to slip into what 
might be called, perhaps exaggeratedly, a “voluntarist” position.37   Althusser 
writes in Machiavelli and Us:
“Admittedly, Machiavelli adopts the viewpoint of the people. But while the 
Prince who is assigned the mission of unifying the Italian nation must 
become a popular prince, he is not himself the people. Equally, the people are 
not summoned to become the Prince. So there is an irreducible duality 
between the place of the political viewpoint and the place of political force 
and practice; between the ‘subject’ of the political viewpoint—the people—
and the ‘subject of the political practice: the Prince. is duality, this 
irreducibility, aﬀects both the Prince and the people. Being uniquely and 
exclusively defined by the function he must perform—that is to say by the 
historical vacuum he must fill—the Prince is a pure aleatory possibility—
impossibility. No class membership disposes him to assume his historical 
task; no social tie binds him to this people whom he must unify into a 
nation.”38
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Here, once again, “aleatory” is a later addition. More problematic, however, is 
the “void” stuck on to the figure of the Prince, the “absolute” will, that 
emerges from and is aﬃrmed on the basis of the “vacuum” of historical 
conditions. In a certain sense, the Prince is “subtracted” from the dynamic of 
the conflict, the contingent encounter of elements in the struggle, making 
him, in eﬀect, a “pure” principle.
Distancing Machiavelli’s manifesto from that of Marx and Engels, Althusser 
–in an  admittedly ambivalent way—maintains that while the latter is 
internal to a class viewpoint, the former maintains a distance from any class 
perspective, because the Prince neither becomes the people nor the people 
the Prince. Political practice in this sense is installed in an empty (vuoto) 
space that must remain empty (vuoto).39
us, it seems to me that the best way of interpreting these texts is to 
preserve their ambivalence, complexity and stratification without collapsing 
Althusser into a non-existent Machiavelli in order to convert Althusser into 
a theoretical instrument in the service of “a democracy without conflict.” In 
fact, this would only obliterate what is most powerful and original in 
Machiavelli’s legacy: that political success is always only  partial and 
conflictual, that the Prince only operates within and through the 
conjuncture, without in any way being able to determine, from the outside 
and in a transcendental way, this conjuncture.
Emmanuel Terray, for example, has written that Althusser has demonstrated 
his understanding of Machiavelli by such phrases as “founding on a void” 
and the “solitude” of the founder. 40  Founding on the void means remaining 
outside of the conflict and overcoming original natural violence to found the 
state.41
A more articulated version of this is the concept of “radical democracy” 
elaborated by Miguel Vatter, based precisely on the void (vuoto), on the 
“solitude” and on the distance that separates the Machiavelian Prince from 
the political and from conflict. 42
  Machiavelli, writes Vatter, maintains that there exists a substantial 
diﬀerence between the desire of the great to dominate and the desire of the 
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people not to be dominated.43  us, popular politics would always be this 
side (al di qua) of every political form, of every will to domination, of any 
constitutive project. It would be for its part a pure retreat into a zone of 
neutrality, indiﬀerence and “negative freedom.”e power (potenza) of the 
people would be the inverse of Spinozist power (potenza).44  It is a force that 
remains indiﬀerent to its own realization, a pure possibility whose sole desire 
is not to be governed.
To define this type of power, Vatter draws on the one hand from the 
Arendtian tradition of isonomia with its notion of “no-rule” and on the other 
from Giorgio Agamben’s idea, developed in Homo Sacer, of a possibility or a 
potentiality, conceived in non-Aristotelian terms, indiﬀerent to its own 
actualization. Vatter proclaims in Machiavelli, particularly Althusser’s 
Machiavelli, a “sovereign in-diﬀerence of the people toward the 
government,” pointing towards a democracy that would not be a form of 
“government,” in the sense of  kratos that is that would not be a form of 
domination, but a new concept of liberty in the post-marxist context.45
e passage from the “civil” Prince to civil society, based on a “pacification” of 
the very conflicts in which it originated is, to say the least, a distortion of 
Machiavelli’s text. His originality consists precisely in developing a theory of 
conflict that neither prefigures nor, from a distance,  corresponds to the idea 
of natural conflict as expressed later in natural law theory, nor even less 
concludes with the creation of “civil society.” As we have seen, Althusser’s 
reading in its ambivalences leaves a wide margin for interpretation, but it is 
inappropriate to deny these ambivalences in order to construct a reading of 
Machiavelli that forgets and obliterates the theory of conflict.
e theoretical force of Machiavelli emerges without ambivalence for 
Althusser in the writings on aleatory materialism, much more in fact than in 
the writings devoted to Machiavelli himself. Althusser’s encounter with 
Machiavelli—to cite Terray again—first occurred through Montesquieu  and 
the eighteenth century reaction to contractualism, and a bit later through 
Gramsci. He must have also encountered Machiavelli through Spinoza, as 
Terray  says, but there is no textual evidence of such an encounter.46  If this is 
so, it can be said that up to this point, on the theoretical level, there had been 
no “encounter” at all. Instead, it was precisely with Spinoza and more 
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generally within the underground cuurent of materialism, that Machiavelli 
“burst” into Althusser’s thought.
us, in the light of aleatory materialism we can re-read Althusser’s “self-
accusation” as being outside of philosophy, as well as his claim of being “only” 
a political agitator in philosophy in the light of aleatory materialism. It is a 
very strange non-philosopher who produces such powerful eﬀects within and 
against philosophy. His self-accusation is practically a carbon copy of 
Machiavelli’s “admission” that he is only a man of the people who has the 
presumption to speak to the Prince.47  As it is necessary not to be the Prince 
in order to produce eﬀects on the Prince, so it is necessary not to be a 
philosopher in order to produce eﬀects on philosophy.
e entire dispositive of aleatory materialism is placed in the service of this 
enterprise and not only Machiavelli who is merely one of the atoms that 
comprise it. Among the most salient points in this materialist attack on 
philosophy is the revolt against the homogeneous continuity of history: the 
idea of knowledge (conoscenza) as “construction” passes as much through 
Machiavelli as through Spinoza. Another would be the opposition of 
contingency not to necessity, but to teleology. e void and the atoms, wrote 
Althusser in “e Underground Current,” are not the foundation of 
freedom, but rather a guarantee of the absence of any plane prior to the 
encounter. Nothing but the factical circumstances of the encounter has 
prepared the encounter. is is a powerful, original and revolutionary use of 
Machiavelli that paradoxically, once again, does not emerge in the writings 
devoted to Machiavelli, but arises forcefully in those in which Machiavelli is 
placed in the theoretical container of aleatory materialism.
“We no more choose our masters than our time.” 48So wrote Althusser and 
so we must interpret this encounter, both contingent and necessary, between 
his “non-philosophy” and the “non-philosophy” of Machiavelli. To confront 
this encounter is a little like confronting the encounter between Spinoza and 
Marx. It is a matter of encounters that give meaning to the void (vuoto) in 
which they take place, or perhaps, more precisely, are produced in the giving 
itself. e void is that of an “impossible linearity.” Just as the encounter 
between Spinoza and Marx resists any linearity, including the construction 
of a tradition, however materialist, so can the encounter  between Althusser 
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and Machiavelli be described this way: an encounter that most often 
proceeds by means of deviation, loss, mystification and ambivalence. 
e most interesting theoretical force and movement, exactly as in the case 
of Spinoza and Marx, consists in forcing the texts.49  In this case, to force 
Althusser’s analysis of Machiavelli and with it, the role and status the latter 
assumes within the global dispositive of aleatory materialism. To shed light 
on this tension, together with the ambivalences of the Althusserian text, 
means again freeing his thought from a purely instrumental use and 
returning it to its articulated temporality. Further, it is precisely this tension 
that makes the encounter between Machiavelli and Althusser so fresh and 
actual. “I am not a philosopher,” he wrote in a letter to Franca, “and yet it is 
necessary to be one. . . . But it’s not for me, because there are so many things 
to learn and I don’t have the time.” It is precisely this  incompleteness, that is 
the key to the encounter with Machiavelli, who in the preface to the first 
book of Discourses writes: “if poor talent and little experience . . . make this 
attempt of mine defective and of little utility, it will at least show the way to 
someone with more virtue, more discourse and more judgment who will be 
able to fulfill my intention.” 
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